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Abstract
This  paper  analyzes  the  implications  of inefficient financial  inter-
mediation  for crisis management  in a country  where firms are highly-
indebted.  The  analysis  is based  on  a  model  in  which  firms rely  on
bank  credit  to  finance  their  working  capital  needs  and  lenders  face
high  state  verification  and  enforcement  costs  of loan  contracts.  The
analysis shows that  higher contract  enforcement  and verification  costs,
lower expected  productivity,  or higher  volatility,  may  shift  the  econ-
omy to the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve, with potentially  sizable
employment  and output  losses.  The main  implication  of this  analysis
for the current  policy debate  on crisis management  in East  Asia is that
debt  reduction,  in  addition  to  debt  rescheduling,  may  be required  as
part  of the  process  of reducing  financial sector inefficiencies.
JEL  Classification  Numbers:  E44, F36, I31
*World Bank Institute,  Washington DC 20433.  **Department of Economics, Dart-
mouth College,  Hanover NH 03755, and NBER. The views expressed here do not neces-
sarily represent those of the Fund or the World Bank.
11  Introduction
There is substantial  agreement  among economists that  inefficiencies in finan-
cial  intermediation  and  weaknesses  in the  banking  sector  exacerbated  the
economic and  financial  crisis that  erupted  in East  Asia in the  aftermath  of
the  collapse of the  Thai  baht.1  High costs of operation,  inadequate  lending
practices,  large volumes of nonperforming  loans, excessive exposure  to some
sectors,  large unhedged short-term  liabilities in foreign currency,  and lax su-
pervision were all pervasive features of the financial system  in those  countries
that  suffered most  from the crisis.
The events in East Asia have led to renewed emphasis on crisis prevention
and crisis management.  In particular,  it has been stressed that  the regulatory
and  supervisory  framework  of the  financial  system  must  be  strengthened
prior  to  opening the  capital  account,  and that  governments  must  limit the
implicit  guarantees  that  they provide to investors  (Dooley, 1998).  Adequate
bankruptcy  procedures  must  also  be  in  place to  allow illiquid  but  solvent
firms to  undergo  restructuring  following a crisis.  As recently emphasized  by
Miller and  Stiglitz  (1999), debt  relief, rather  than  debt  restructuring,  may
also be an important  component  of crisis management.
Using a different approach,  the present paper also emphasizes the possible
need for debt  relief in crisis management.  The key source  of our result  is a
particular  form of financial  sector inefficiencies: high  costs  associated  with
the  enforcement  of loan  contracts.  This  is  indeed  an  important  issue  in
the  context  of the  East  Asia  crisis;  limitations  in  the  ability  of banks  to
enforce the provisions of loan contracts  (including seizure of collateral)  have
been viewed by some observers as one of the  major  weaknesses of the legal
infrastructure  that  characterizes  many of the Asian  countries  that  suffered
from contagion  in the aftermath  of the Thai  baht  crisis.
The remainder  of the paper  proceeds as follows. Section II describes the
'For  a detailed  analysis  of the  causes, propagation,  and  policy responses  to, the  Asian
crisis, see Alba  et al.  (1999), and  Radelet  and  Sachs  (1998).
2analytical  framework.  The  model used here  combines the  costly state  ver-
ification  approach  pioneered  by Townsend (1979) and  the  model  of limited
enforceability  of contracts  used in the  external  debt  literature,  as in Eator,.
et al.  (1986), Bulow and  Rogoff (1989), and  Helpman  (1989a).2 It  empha-
sizes the direct  link between bank credit  and the supply  side (through  firms'
working capital  needs),  borrowing by domestic  banks  on world capital  mar-
kets.3 In addition  to  the  new debt  contracted  to  finance labor  costs during
the production  period, firms also hold a large initial  stock  of debt that  they
must repay out  of current  revenue.  Section III derives the  debt Laffer curve
that  arises in  a  setting  in which  firms are highly-indebted  and  determines
the  optimal  level of debt.  Section IV analyzes  the  effect  of a reduction  in
the efficiency of the financial intermediation  process (characterized  by an in-
crease in  contract  enforcement  and  verification  costs),  an  adverse  expected
shock to  productivity,  and  higher  volatility  of productivity  shocks,  on the
optimal  level  of debt.  It  is  shown that  all of these  shocks  may  shift  the
economy to  the  wrong side of the  debt  Laffer curve.  Thus,  as emphasized
by Krugman  (1988) and  Sachs (1989) in their  analysis of the  debt  overhang
in a more general context,  reducing the face value of debt  would make both
parties  better  off-assuming  that  coordination  failures between  debtors  and
creditors  can indeed  be eliminated.  Section V summnarizes the main  results
of the  paper  and  considers its implications  for the  current  policy debate  on
crisis management  in East Asia.
2See FReixas  and Rochet (1997) for a useful description of the costly state verification
approach to credit markets.
3The general framework on which the model developed here is based was used to exam-
ine a variety of issues, including, in particular, the real and financial effects of contagious
shocks  and the welfare  costs of financial  openness. See Agenor  and Aizenman (1998, 1999),
and Agenor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister (1998).
32  The  Analytical  Framework
Consider  an  economy where risk-neutral  banks  provide  intermediation  ser-
vices. Producers  demand  credit from banks  (lenders) to finance their working
capital needs, which consist only of labor costs.  Output  is subject  to random
productivity  shocks.  Following Townsend  (1979), the  realized  productivity
shock is revealed  to  banks  only  at  a  cost.  In the  event  of default  by any
given producer on its bank loans, the creditor  seizes a fraction  of the realized
value of output.  Seizing involves two types  of costs:  first,  the  cost  involved
in verifying the actual value of output,  as mentioned  earlier; second,  the cost
of enforcing repayment,  because enforcement  of the  terms  of loan contracts
requires costly recourse to the legal system.
2.1  Producers
Following Ag6nor and  Aizenman  (1998), we assume that  the producers  start
the period with a large initial level of debt, D.  For simplicity, we will assume
that  the  interest  rate  on the  initial  debt  is  zero;  assuming  that  the  debt
matures  at the  end  of the  period,  repayment  is thus  also  equal to  D.  The
production  function  is given by
Yh = nh3(1 +  6  +  Eh),  (1)
where 6 > 0 and h =  1, ...N refers to producer h.  The idiosyncratic  shock eh
is assumed  to be  distributed  symmetrically  over the interval  (-em,m)A
The representative  producer  repays the  initial  debt in good states  of na-
ture,  and  chooses (partial)  default  in bad  states.  In  case of default  on the
initial  debt, creditors  are able to confiscate a fraction  X of the realized value
of output.  Thus,  default  occurs when
)(n'h(1  +  6 +  Eh)  <  D,  O  < X(  < 1.  (2)
4Note that,  in  contrast  to the  original  model in  Agenor  and  Aizenman  (1998),  we do
not  account  for aggregate  shocks.
4The left-hand  side of equation  (2) is the producer's  repayment  following
a default,  whereas  the right-hand  side is the contractual  repayment.  Equiv-
alently, the  producer  will service the  initial debt  according  to5
min [D; xnh(1 +  6 +  ±h)]  (3)
Let e* denote  the threshold  value of the  productivity  shock below which
partial  default  (at the margin)  occurs on the initial  level of debt, that  is 6
D  =  Xn(++e*).
Solving this  equation  for e* yields D/Xn3  - 1 - 3.  Clearly, this  value of
E*  can be less than  the lower support  of the  distribution,  -Em.  In that  case,
we impose e  =-em  When  e* =  -em  default  never occurs  because  any
realization of the shock will always induce full repayment.  We can thus  write
e* = max [D/xnj-  1-;-Em.  *  (4)
As in Agenor and Aizenman (1998), each producer finances his labor costs
with  bank  credit.  Let  X denote  the representative  bank's  bargaining  power
on the new debt.  There may be a difference between the ability to enforce old
debt  and the  new debt  contract  (that  is, between  K, and X). This  difference
may reflect the possibility  that  the new debt  is financed  mostly by domestic
banks, whereas  the initial  debt is mostly foreign debt.7
Let e* be the threshold value of the productivity  shock that  induces partial
default  on  the  new  debt.  We assume  that,  in  bad  states  of nature,  the
producer would choose to default partially  on the old debt, before defaulting
on the new one; that  is, e* < E*.8 This assumption  implies that  whenever the
producer  defaults  on the  new debt  (that  is, when  the  realization  Ch  <  e*),
51n what  follows indifference on the  borrower's  part  is resolved  in favor  of the  lender.
6 f  default  never  occurs,  e*  is  set at  the  lower end  of the  support  (e* =-em).
7The qualitative  features  of our analysis  are basically  unchanged  if 'c  =  X.
8As shown  in the  Appendix,  results  similar  to those  derived  below  continue  to hold in
the  case where  the  old debt  has  seniority.
5default  necessarily  occurs  also on the  initial  debt-in  which  case creditors
seize a fraction XYh of realized output,  leaving a fraction  (1 - X)Yh of output
from which creditors  of the  new debt  can seize Kc.
Given these  assumptions,  debt service on the new debt  is determined  by
nidn [(1 + rL)wnh; c(l  - X)nh3(1  + 6 + 6h)] ,  (5)
where rL denotes  the contractual  interest  rate  on the new debt.  This  condi-
tion implies that  e* is given by
(1 + rL)wnh =  c(l - X)nh(1  + 6 + e*),
or, rearranging  terms,
Et  (1 +  rL)wnh  _  1-6  (6)
K('-  X)nflh
Using (4) and  (6), the  assumption  that  E* <E*  is thus equivalent  to
D(l-X)  >  (1 + rL)wnh.  (7)
x
Condition  (7) is likely to  be met  for a large  enough  level of the  initial
debt  D, or for a relatively  large  K  and small X.
Assuming that  condition  (7) holds,  and that  the  price of output  is con-
stant and normalized to unity, expected profits of the representative  producer
are given by
Ih =;  [nh(1+6+eh)-DIf(6h)dEh+(1-X)  |  nh(l+6+eh)f  (Eh)deh  (8)
-(1  +  rL)wnh  j  f(£h)dEh  - K(1  - X) J  nh(1  +  6 +  Eh)f(6h)d6h-
The  first  two terms  in this  equation  represent  expected  revenue,  net  of
repayment on old debt.  The last two terms adjust downward expected profits
by expected  repayment  on the  new debt.  The  first term  on the  right-hand
6side of this  equation  measures revenue in  "good" states  of nature  (in which
case the  borrower repays the  old debt  in full), whereas  the second  measures
net revenue after  confiscation in  "bad"  states  (in which case the  producer's
repayment  on  the  old  debt  is only  a  fraction  X of realized  output).  The
third  term measures repayment on the new debt in good states  of nature  and
the  last term  measures  the value of output  that  is confiscated as a result  of
defaulting on both  the old and the new debt.
2.2  Banks  and  New  Debt
The  representative  bank  has  information  about  the  choice  of labor  input
by producer  h, and  determines  the  interest  rate  such that  the expected  net
repayment  equals the  cost  of credit.  Each  bank  is assumed  to  deal  with  a
large number  of independent  producers,  allowing the  bank  to  diversify the
idiosyncratic  risk, Eh.
In case of default,  the bank's  net profit is given by the difference between
contractual  repayment  and  the gross cost of funds:
(1 +  rL)wnh  - (1 + rc)wnh,  (9)
where rc  denotes  the cost of funds for the bank,  assumed  given.
In case of default,  the bank's  net profit is the producer's  repayment  minus
the gross cost of funds and minus the cost of state  verification  and  contract
enforcement,  denoted  C, which is assumed to  be independent  from the  cost
(and  amount)  of funds borrowed by producer  h:
r(1  -X)n(l  +  6 + Eh) -C-  (1 + rc)wnh.  (10)
9The analysis  can easily  be extended  to consider  the case  where C is proportional  to
repayment;  see Agenor,  Aizenman,  and Hoffmaister  (1998). It would  be more involved,
however,  if some  costs were asssumed  to accrue after the information  about the idosyn-
cratic shock is obtained. In such circumstances,  banks would  refrain from forcing  debt
repayment  when  realized  productivity  is below  a threshold  of enforcement.  For  simplicity
of exposition,  and because  they would  not modify  the key results discussed  below,  we
abstract from these considerations.  We also ignore  all other real costs associated  with
financial  intermediation.
7The first term in this expression  accounts for the fact that  the producer
first repays a fraction X  on the initial debt, before servicing  the new debt.
Assuming  risk neutrality and competitive  banks, the rent dissipation con-
dition implies that the interest rate on the new debt, rL, is set according to,
using (9) and (10):
rem
(1 + rc)wnh  =  (1 + rL)wnh  m f(Eh)d£h  (11)
+  J  [Or (I +  6 + Eh) - C f(eh)deh,
-emn
where a  = ,(1  - X).  This expression  can be rewritten in the form
rL - rc  =  w  0 |  nh(*-  e)  f(eh)dEh  + Cp|  f (6h)dEhi.  (12)
Equation (12) shows  that the spread between the contractual lending rate
and the bank' funding cost is the sum of two terms: the first measures the
expected revenue lost due to  (partial) default in bad states of nature,  and
the second the expected state verification  and contract enforcement costs.
Applying (11) to (8), we can rewrite the expression  for the representative
producer's expected profits as
I  nh  [  (1+6+6h)-D]f  (Eh)dEh+(l-X)  J  nph(1+6+Eh)f(eh)dEh  (13)
-(l  +  rc)wnh-C  |  f(  h)dEh,
_em
where E*,  the threshold level of productivity associated with partial default
on the new debt (as given in (6)), can be rewritten as
On'3(1  + 6 + e£) =  (1 + rc)wnh  +  I  [Ono(&  Eh)  + C]f(Eh)d-h.  (14)
82.3  Optimal  Employment
The optimal level of employment is determined by maximizing expected prof-
its,  equation  (13), subject  to  (14).1o The corresponding  first-order  condition
is obtained  by setting  lInh  = 0, that  is
flnCh  {f  n,,(l  +  6 +  eh)f(6h)d6h  +  (1  - X)  r  nh(1  +  6  +  Ch)f(6h)d--h
(15)
-(1  + rc)w  -Cf(6)  d  = 0,
dnh
where
dE*  Oon 1(1 + 6 + e*)  - w(1 + rc)  - 8nh3-1 f.hm(e  )f(Eh)d£h
dnh  On'h  f.g  f  (--h)de - Cf(£*)
Substituting  (14) into the right-hand  side of dE*/dnh we infer that
ds*  (1  )(1-  6)(1  +  rc)wnh  - /c CfJn  f(Eh)deh
dnh  nh  Onh fs'g f (Eh)de-Cf  (E*)
Hence, as long as C is not too  large, dE*/dnh > 0.
Proposition  1  The optimal level of employment,  nh,  is given by
nh =  fih(X,  rc,  C, D),  (16)
and it  depends negatively on the four  arguments in  (16).
To establish  for instance  that  dfih/dC  < 0, note first  that
sg [Ld  = sg [  n  ]
1 0 Following our  earlier  paper  (Ag6nor and  Aizemnan,  1998) we assume  in what  follows
that  each individual  producer  takes the  contractual  lending rate  as given when determining
the  optimal  level of employment.
9Applying the second-order condition for maximization yields
sg [lnhC  =  f (W  )(dn ) < 0,
which implies in turn that  dnih/dC < 0.
Suppose that  eh  follows  a uniform distribution, so that  f(Eh)  =  1/2Em,
and Pr(Ch  > x) =  (Em - x)/2em. It can then be established that  an increase
in em, which can  then be interpreted as a  (mean-preserving) increase in
volatility, reduces optimal employment (dfih/dEm < 0).  To do so, note first
that
89  [-J=sg  E[lnhE m h
From (15),  llnh  =  0 now  yields
h31  {j*  2  d6h +  (1-  X) Lem  2gf  (h)deh}
-(1  + rc)w  - =  d  0,
2e-m  dnh  =O
which in turn  implies that
-(I  +  rc)W.
rnhem  =<  07 IIflhCmEm
where  from  (6)  de*/dnh  =  (1 - 3)(1 + rL)wnhi/rl  (1 -XV
3  The  Initial  Debt  Laffer Curve
Assuming, to simplify notations,  a zero subjective discount rate,  the  expected
value of the  initial debt  is given by
{D  if s* =-Em
{D  fr f (Eh)de  +  f!cm ghf (-h)d-hi  if e* >  -m
" 1 A more complete Appendix providing exact expressions for all the derivatives shown
in Proposition 1 is available upon request. We also show in that Appendix that  the effect
of /c on optimal employment is positive.
10where
gh  =  xn3(l  +  6  +  Eh)  -C.
This expression  assumes, for simplicity, that  verification  and enforcement
costs  associated  with  servicing the  new and  the  initial  debt  are the  same.
It  shows that  when  default  never  occurs  (e* =  -Em))  the  expected  value
of the  debt  is  simply  its  face value;  when,  by  contrast,  the  possibility  of
default  exists  (E*  >  Em),  the situation  is more complex.  Specifically, it can
be established  from  the  above expression  that  a  higher initial  debt  has  an
ambiguous effect on the expected value of the debt:
dV  _  fm  _6d  Cf (?)  (17)
dD  f(Eh)dE  P
+ {J[:Xnf-1(1  + 6 + Eh)f(Eh)dE  + Cf(E*)
h  ~~~~~x4iJdD  <
The debt  Laffer curve characterized  by Equation  (17) is depicted  in the
upper  panel of Figure  1 as LL.  It  is linear up to  a threshold  level of debt  D
(corresponding  to the  segment LB)  given by
L)=xnh  (I  +  -Em),
which corresponds  to  equation  (4) with  -Em.
Expected  repayment  increases one for one with  the  initial  value of debt;
the segment  LB  is thus  along a 45-degree line.
For levels of initial  debt  (marginally)  above D, equation  (17) boils  down
to  ~~dV -1_Cf(?)  - (,ID)dh to  ~~~dD 1  Xno  - nh  )(dD)}
Assuming that  enforcement costs  C are small enough,  that  is, that  C  is
such that
>__f___  /3D)dnh 
Xn1 >  - nh  dD  J
then,  for relatively  small levels of initial  debt  above D, the  curve LL  is up-
ward sloping.  Note also that  a larger level of initial debt increases  E,  thereby
11reducing the first term  on the right-hand  side of equation  (17); this term  ap-
proaches zero for a large enough level of initial debt.  Similarly, higher initial
levels of debt  raise  the  absolute  value of the  second,  negative  term  in  the
above expression,  because  dnh/dD  < 0:  a higher  level of initial  debt  lowers
employment  and  thus  output,  making  default  more probable  and  lowering
the value of claims  that  creditors  can seize in case of default.  Hence, for a
large enough level of initial debt, the right-hand  side of (17) is negative.  The
"optimal"  level of initial  debt,  denoted  by D*, corresponds  to  the  value of
the stock of debt  for which dV/dD  = 0 and is obtained  at point  A. Beyond
point  B, the  probability  of repayment  falls below unity;  and below point  A,
levels of debt  are so high that  additional  amounts  of debt  actually  lower ex-
pected  repayments.  Consequently,  the  association  between  the  contractual
value of the initial debt  and its expected  value has the typical  inverted U (or
concave) shape  that  characterizes  the  debt  Laffer curve  (Krugman,  1989).
The difference between the (present)  value of the  country's  contractual  debt
obligations  and  the expected resource transfers  that  will be made to  service
that  debt,  V, measures the  debt  overhang (Krugman,  1988).  Thus,  as long
as ?  >  -Er-that  is, as long as the  possibility  of default  is allowed for in
bad states  of nature-and  as long as D > D*, the  country  will suffer from a
debt overhang.  Creditors  would then  benefit  from a lower contractual  value
of the  initial  stock  of debt,  because it would increase  the  expected  value of
their  debt  claims.
The lower panel of Figure  1 depicts the relation  between optimal  employ-
ment  and  the  initial  level of debt,  as given by  (16).  The  first  segment  of
curve,  HH',  is flat,  because  optimal  employment,  in the  absence of default
risk (e* =-em)  does not depend  on initial debt.  The reason  is that  the cost
of credit  depends  on expected  verification  and  enforcement  costs,  which in
turn  depend  on the  probability  of default;  for D less D that  probability  is
zero and thus  the  level of initial  debt  has no effect on the  cost  of credit,  as
can be inferred from  (12). Beyond point H' the curve is convex to the origin.
12At the optimal  level of initial debt D*, employment is given by ih  (point E).
The following proposition  can be easily established:
Proposition  2  Less efficient financial intermediation,  as measured by higher
state verification  and contract enforcement  costs (a rise in  C),  or lower ex-
pected productivity  (a lower value of .)  reduce the optimal value of the initial
debt. In  both cases the debt Laffer curve shifts  downward and to the left.
To establish  that  dD*/dC  <  0,  for instance,  note  that  by the  implicit
function  theorem,  we have
dD*/dC  = -VDC/VDD.
Applying the  second-order condition  for maximization  yields
FdD*1f()  __
sg  =  =sg[VDC]  =I  _  {  (  )(dh)=  < °
LdC  Xnh  nhd  I
A diagrammatic  illustration  of this proposition  is also provided in Figure
1.  Except  for the  linear  segment  LB,  the  shape  of the  debt  Laffer curve
depends  on both  the  cost of financial intermediation  and  the  expected  pro-
ductivity  shock.  For instance,  an increase in enforcement  costs  (a rise in C)
shifts the  BL  segment of the curve in the upper  panel leftward  and  inward,
to  BL'.  The  optimal  value  of initial  debt  is  determined  at  point  A".  In
the lower panel,  the  relation  between  optimal  employment  and  initial  debt
becomes  also steeper  beyond  the  threshold  value D; the  new optimal  value
of employment  is determined  at point  E",  and  is lower than  the  nh,  as es-
tablished  in Proposition  1.
The  figure also  illustrates  an  important  implication  of the  analysis:  if,
at the  initial  level of C,  D* is the  optimal  value of initial  debt  (that  is, the
value for which dV/dD  = 0), at the new value of C the initial  D* will be too
high because  it  will be located  on the  wrong side  of the  debt  Laffer curve
(point A').  Employment,  at E',  will be also lower than  the new optimal value
13E".  Thus,  less efficient financial intermediation  does not  only  increase  the
likelihood that  the  economy may be stuck  in an  inefficient equilibrium  (on
the wrong  portion  of the  debt  Laffer curve),  but  it  is also  associated  with
(potentially  large) employment  and output  losses in the  short  term.
Finally, it can also be shown that,  under the assumption  that  the idiosyn-
cratic shock Eh is uniformly distributed,  an increase in Em, which is equivalent
to a  (mean-preserving)  increase in volatility, has qualitatively  similar effects
on the shape of the  debt Laffer curve as those  associated  with  an increase in
intermediation  costs or lower expected output.
4  Summary  and  Policy  Implications
The purpose of this  paper has been to examine the implications  of inefficient
financial intermediation  for crisis management  in a country  where firms are
faced with  a high level of initial  debt  and contract  new borrowing  from do-
mestic banks  to  finance  labor costs.  The analysis was based  on a model of
credit  market  imperfections  that  emphasizes  the  costs  of contract  enforce-
ment  and  state  verification  costs.  The  first  part  presented  the  analytical
framework  and  focused  on the  determination  of domestic  interest  rates  on
the new debt  (which are set  as a mark-up  over the  cost of borrowing,  with
the size of the  mark-up  related positively  to  the probability  of default)  and
optimal  employment,  which was showed to depend,  in particular,  negatively
on the cost of state  verification and  contract  enforcement,  as well as the ini-
tial stock of foreign debt obligations held by domestic firms.  The second part
derived the debt Laffer curve with regard to the initial  debt  and the optimal
level of debt consistent  with the  absence of a debt overhang.  The third  part
analyzed  the  effect of an  increase  in  contract  enforcement  and  verification
costs, as well as an expected negative shock to output  and  an increase in the
volatility  of productivity  shocks, on the optimal  level of debt.  It  was shown
that,  as a result  of either  shock, the economy may find itself on the  wrong
14side of the debt Laffer curve, where a debt overhang may emerge.  Moreover,
the analysis showed that  this shift may be accompanied  with  (possibly large)
employment  and  output  losses in the short  term.
The  key result  of the  paper,  thus,  is that  in  countries  where  financial
intermediation  is highly inefficient  (in the  sense that  enforcement  costs  of
loan contracts,  for instance,  are relatively  high),  or in  a country  experienc-
ing  large  adverse  output  shocks and  higher  volatility,  the  likelihood  of an
inefficient equilibrium  is also high.  The  policy implications  of these  results
in the context  of the  current  debate  on crisis management  in  East  Asia are
rather  clear.  To  many  observers, one  of the  surprises  that  surfaced  in the
immediate  aftermath  of the crisis was that  the  outstanding  stock of private
debt  (particularly  in Korea and  Thailand)  was much larger than  previously
assumed.  This  is illustrated  in Figure  2, which shows  how quickly banks
and  nonfinancial  firms  accumulated  external  liabilities  in the  early  to  mid-
1990s.  The  crisis revealed  also the precarious  state  of the  private  banking
system,  and the relative  high cost of bankruptcy  procedures."2 Furthermore,
the  deep recession  (a  sequence of negative  output  shocks)  in  the  affected
countries may have altered the view that  the  "Far East  Tigers"  will continue
to enjoy sustained  high growth  rates,  escaping  the  consequences of the  law
of diminishing  marginal  productivity.  Figure  3, which  shows the  behavior
of the  cyclical component  of industrial  production  (based  on the  use of the
Hodrick-Prescott  filter to  detrend  the  original series),  suggests  indeed  that
expected  output  shocks may have turned  negative after  the Thai  baht  crisis.
There  was also  a  significant  increase  in  output  volatility  in  the  aftermath
of the  crisis:  the  coefficient of variation  of industrial  production  increased
from  3.6 percent  during  the  period  January  1991-June  1997 to  6.8 percent
1 2We do not  have firm evidence, at  this  stage,  that  verification  and  enforcement  costs of
loan contracts  increased  significantly in the region in the  aftermath  of the  crisis.  However,
it  is  possible  that  such  costs  rose  indeed.  Asymmetic  information  problems  ten  to  be
exacerbated  in  a  more  volatile  economic  environment,  thereby  forcing  banks  to  expend
more resources  to assess  and  verify claims  made by borrowers  regarding  their  situation.
15for the period July  1997-December 1998 in Korea.  For Malaysia,  comparable
numbers  are 4.3 percent  and  5.2 percent  respectively,  and for Thailand  6.3
percent  and  6.6 percent.  These  developments probably  increased  the  per-
ception  (and likelihood) that  some of these countries-particularly  those like
Indonesia and  Korea,  where domestic firms were highly indebted-may  now
be on the  wrong side of the debt  Laffer curve.  As shown earlier, lower pro-
ductivity, higher volatility  of output,  and higher financial intermediation  and
enforcement  costs shift the  debt Laffer curve leftward and  inward,  whereas a
larger outstanding  stock of debt shifts the economy's position  to the right-
sufficiently so in some cases to create  a debt  overhang problem.
A  large  debt  overhang  entails  well-known economic  costs,  induced  by
both  illiquidity  and disincentive effects. 13 In the context  of our analysis, the
short-term  employment  and  output  costs  associated  with  a  debt  overhang
can also be substantial.  Consequently, it may be  beneficial to  both  debtors
and  creditors to act collectively to reduce the face value of debt.  Specifically,
in the  case of East  Asia, attempts  to hasten  economic recovery may require
debt  forgiveness,  in  addition  to  debt  rescheduling.  In  practice,  of course,
it is difficult to  coordinate  debt reduction  among a large group of creditors
because of the  free-rider problem that  such operations  create:  each creditor
has an incentive to refrain from offering debt relief on its own claims and wait
for others  to  do so, thereby  raising the  expected  value of its  own claims.'4
Such externalities  do not,  however,  create  a prima  facie  case for welfare-
improving govermnent  intervention,  in particular  because  of the  well-known
moral hazard  problems that  such intervention  creates.
1 3See Krugman  (1988) and  Sachs  (1989).  In particular,  a high level of debt  creates  un-
certainty  about  the country's  capacity  to service its  debt and  discourages  private  (domestic
and  foreign) investment.  Eurthermore,  high debt  service may  be perceived  by investors  as
a form of tax  on the  future  income  of the  country,  thus  dissuading  new investment.
'4See Sachs (1989).  As shown by Helpman  (1989b),  if lenders interact  noncooperatively,
each  of  them  taken  individually  may  in  fact  be  willing  to  provide  some  debt  relief-
although  not  as much  as they  would if they  were to  act collectivelly.
16Appendix
This Appendix  considers the case in which the initial debt,  D, is senior to
new debt.  New lending is done by foreign banks.  For simplicity, these banks
have identical enforcement  costs to the senior banks.  This cost is paid by the
relevant bank  in a lump-sum  fashion each time  that  the  country  defaults  on
its obligations  to  that  bank.  In states  of partial  default,  new (junior)  banks
get only the residual of the debt service after repaying the initial debt  to the
senior banks.  In this  setup,  the country  will default  first  on the junior  debt
at a low enough  value of the productive  shock, E*. The country  will default
on both  types  of debt  at a lower value of the productivity  shock,  < E*.
The repayment  rule for producer  h is given by
min [(1 +  rL)wnh  + D; Xyh],  (Al)
where  yh  is given in  (1).
The threshold  value E* is determined  by the equality
Xnhl(1+6+e*)  =  (l+rL)wnh+Di
so that
*  (1 +  rL)wnh  + D E  =rnax  Ixn  -1-8;-8m].
* is now given by
Xnh3(1  +  6+E  D.
Expected  profits  of producer  h are now given by
Hh=  [Yh  - D - (1 + rL)wnh]If(eh)deh  (A2)
-x  yhf(Eh)d8h.
The net junior  debt service from the  point of view of the junior  banks is
given by
max {XYh-D;  O}-C  if  Eh <  EA,
(A3)
(1 + rL)wnh  if £h  >  E*.
17Expected  repayment  for the bank,  which determines  the  interest  rate  on
the new debt,  rL,  is thus  determined  by
rem
(1 +  rc)wnh  =  (1 + rL)wnh  /  f(eh)dEh  (A4)
+ J (Xyh - D)f  (-h)dEh - C|  f(Eh)dEh,
Using (A2) and  (A4) yields
I1  =  (yh-  D)f  (Fh)deh  - X  Yhf(eh)dEh
-(1  +  rc)wnh  +  (XYh  - D)f  (Eh)deh  - C  f(Eh)dEh,
which can be rewritten  as
RIh  =  Yhhf (eh)deh  - D J  f (h)dEh  (A5)
-(1  +  rc)wnh  XJ  Yhf  (&h)dEh  -C  f(Ch)dEh-
Finally,  the  expected  market  value of the  initial  debt  is given  by,  for
g  >  -Em
V  =  D J  f  (Eh)dh  + J  (XYh - C)f  (Eh)dEh-  (A6)
From equations  (A5) and  (A6),  it can be readily  established  that  all the
results summarized  in propositions  1 and 2 given in the text  continue to hold.
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